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∂AIL %2Commentary%1↓165 E. 56th St.↓New York, N.Y. 10022∞
To the Editor:
Norman Podhoretz correctly analyzes the new and dangerous
age we are entering. Moreover, it seems that the Afghanistan
shock is not enough to create national unity behind a new
containment policy. Perhaps the situation is desperate enough
to call for some measures that have heretofore not been considered.
The basis of Western defense has been a loose
alliance led by the United States. This alliance has been faltering
because of weakness by the United States and excessive reliance on
it by other countries. The pathology of the alliance first showed up
when no European country contributed troops to the defense
of South Vietnam, and the U.S. accepted the domestic problems
of the political leaders of these countries as an excuse. This
contrasts to the Korean war situation wherein much weaker European
countries helped.
Here are some measures that might be taken:
1. The U.S. might announce a date for its withdrawal from
NATO and begin by proposing a European commander.
Western Europe has more population and industry than the Soviet Union
If it has to be responsible for its own defense maybe it will.
We might specifically say that we will not defend West Berlin.
Of course, we will be happy to sell the Europeans arms.
2. We might give up trying to prevent nuclear
proliferation. The basis for non-proliferation was collective
security. The Vietnam war showed that collective security had
been reduced to unilateral American defense of other countries,
and that the U.S. had became politically too weak to provide this
defense. If every country has to defend itself as best it can,
then non-proliferation cannot be sustained.
Perhaps Pakistan's rejection of American military aid
represents Finlandization, but maybe it represents their
hope that nuclear weapons will make them too prickly to attack.
The Afghan tribal reliance on Lee-Enfield rifles doesn't seem to be
working.
The Russians probably can't afford to attack even a small country
that has nuclear weapons and some delivery capability.
Even though they can destroy
that country completely, they risk losing some cities and a few
million people while their main potential enemy - America -
is untouched.
Unannounced nuclear proliferation
may be making world politics like a game of five card stud where
some players have aces as hole cards.
3. Perhaps the alternative to detente is German and Japanese
nuclear rearmament. The Russians might be willing to pay a substantial
price to avoid German nuclear rearmament. It will probably take
a few more shocks - say the conquest of West Berlin, Yugoslavia and
Thailand - to arouse the latent military spirit of the Germans
and Japanese, and once aroused, this spirit may take forms we won't like.
4. Perhaps we should accept the fact that American college youth
are blind to the danger or
don't love their country enough to accept a draft. An alternative
that might have saved Vietnam is to create a foreign legion with
American citizenship and a college education as a reward for five
years faithful service.
The above ideas aren't preented as a coherent plan - merely
to express an opinion that our thinking has been running in certain
ruts and there are options not even being considered.
.sgn